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THE INTIFADAH AND THE
ENHANCEMENT OF ISRAELI DEMOCRACY
Nathaniel
Rosen: There is the question of the borders [between
the soon to be established Jewish state and
the Arab state], which we cant ignore.
Ben-Gurion: Everything is possible. If we decide here that
the borders are not to be mentioned, that is
how it will be Nothing is a priori.
Rosen: It's not a question of a priori, but a question
of law.
Ben-Gurion: The law is something that men decide.'
On December 9, 1987, four Palestinians were killed and
seven wounded when an Israeli truck collided with two vans
of Palestinians returning to the Gaza Strip from work in
Israel.2 Four-thousand demonstrators attended the funeral
in Jabalia Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip Two days later,
a total strike was declared and observed by Palestinians
inside Israel as well as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.4
Their demand was for an end to the Israeli occupation of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.5 The strike was proclaimed
by the Palestinians as the beginning of the "intifadah.6
1989 marked the two year anniversary of the begin-
ning of the Palestinian intifadah and the one year anniver-
sary of the Declaration of Independence of the State of
Palestine. The Palestinian people, in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, as well as the refugees from Palestine, have been
able to draw worldwide attention to their struggle for self-
determination.
Through the intifadah, the Palestinians have achieved
a high level of international awareness of their struggle and,
in the process, built the foundations of a viable state. As
long as the intifadah continues, regardless of Israeli reac-
tion to it, the Palestinians move closer to their goal of self-
determination.7 In turn, the debate regarding the Middle-
East has been broadened to include the acceptance of the
Palestinians as a nation.
It is the intent of this essay to show that the enhance-
ment of democracy for the Palestinians would strengthen
Israel's democracy and help preserve the legitimacy of Is-
rael as a nation. Israel's own existence as a nation was
brought about by other nations adhering to international
rules, especially as posited by the United Nations. Israel
Nathaniel K. Charny is a J.D. Candidate, May 1991 at the
State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law.
K. Charny
cannot continue to turn its back on world opinion, inter-
national laws and the United Nations' prescription regard-
ing the Palestinian question. In so doing, it undermines its
claim as a democratic state. The special characteristics of
the situation mandate that in the process of protecting Is-
rael in its vital function as a Jewish homeland, Israel must
respond to the intifadah and recognize the legitimacy of
the intifadah's demands.
The situation in Israel and the territories requires more
than a legal analysis of civil disobedience and revolution.
The Israel/Palestinian issue needs to be looked at contex-
tually, because of its distinctive characteristics. This essay
will first survey the judicial context of both Israeli statehood
and Israel's rationale for its military occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Israeli Judicial system has placed the protection
of Israel as a Jewish state as the highest "constitutional"
fact. This is evidenced by its treatment of the most basic
element of democracy: who may run for elected office. In
addition, the courts and the Knesset have shown an obvi-
ous preference for Israeli nationalists.
A dual system of justice is being played out, to the ex-
treme, in the territories. Under military law, the Palestini-
ans are subject to curfews, arbitrary house searches as well
as reduced civil rights such as a censored press and travel
restrictions.8 In contrast, Israeli settlers are governed by Is-
raeli law, as if they lived in Israel proper.
This essay will then discuss a Palestinian reaction to
this treatment. Being forced to live under such political con-
ditions is ample reason to react. The Palestinian re-action
is the intifadah. They are demanding self-determination and
their promised Arab state. In the process, they have deve-
loped extensive quasi-government structures, self-sufficient
communities, and an increased worldwide recognition of
"stateness.
Finally, the effects of the Palestinian reaction will be
applied to the greater context of both the protection of the
State of Israel, and a concern for human rights and civil
liberties. The intifadah has strengthened Palestinian state-
ness. As a result, it has forced Israel to face the inherent
contradiction of Israel's stated democratic goals and its un-
democratic reaction to the uprising in the territories. In order
to protect its own democracy, Israel must recognize the in-
tifadah's goals as legitimate, especially the major goal: Pales-
tinian self-determination. The strength and unanimity of the
intifadah movement has demanded such recognition. In the
process, Israel's legitimacy as a democracy will be restored.
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I. History
Political zionism was first articulated in 1896 by The-
odore Herzl. The Zionist goal of gaining recognition of the
Jews right to establish a state was greatly strengthened by
the Balfour Declaration in 1917.1 The Declaration was a
letter written by the British Foreign Minister, Arthur James
Balfour, to Lord Rothschild. The letter conveyed sympa-
thy for the Jewish Zionist aspirations and stated that "[h]is
Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people"' 0
The Declaration was conditioned on "it being clearly un-
derstood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice
the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish com-
munities in Palestine . . .
The Declaration was a strong impetus for the recogni-
tion of Palestine as a Jewish national home. The Holocaust
added new life to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine
Because of the Nazi terror in Europe, Jewish populations
in Palestine rose from ten percent in 1919 to thirty percent
in 1939.2 In 1947 the United Nations General Assembly
approved a plan to partition Palestine;' 3 the British Man-
date over Palestine was to end and the two new states (one
Arab, one Jewish) were to achieve independence on May
15, 1948.
The Partition Resolution provided for safeguards to
protect the rights of minorities. For example, the Resolu-
tion guaranteed that Jerusalem would be under intemation-
al regime, thereby providing free access for persons of all
faiths to holy places located in Jerusalem.14 Nonetheless,
the United Nations' adoption of the partition resolution
brought with it a sudden flight of Palestinians to surround-
ing countries.' 5
On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel proclaimed its
establishment. "As the last British troops ceremonially
departed the following day, troops from bordering Arab
countries enetered the area.., and the first Israel-Arab war
began."16 Israeli forces secured a decisive victory that includ-
ed controlling large areas of territory allotted to the Arab
State as well as the western half of Jerusalem, originally
meant for internationalization.
In June of 1967 Israel was again attacked by a num-
ber of its neighbors. 7 Decisive victories for Israel secured
Israeli control of all of Mandated Palestine including Jerusa-
lem. The United Nations' Security Council acted upon its
concern over the extensive military occupations of June
1967, and passed Resolution 242. The resolution called for
Israeli withdrawal from territories as well as recognition of
the Palestinians as people and the reaffirmation of their right
to the constitution of an Arab State' This right had been
established in the League of Nations Covenant, the Bal-
four Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine and the Pales-
tine Partition Resolution. 9 After 1967, the relationship
between Israel and the community of states began to
change. Israel began to minimalize its reliance on the Par-
tition Resolution and United Nations' mandates as a basis
for its lawful existence.20
The ensuing years saw increased violence in the terri-
tories and various p~ace-making attempts. The only truly
successful attempt was the Israel-Egypt peace agreement,
which turned over the Sinai to Egypt, in exchange for peace.
All other attempts at significant peace initiatives have
failed.21
On December 9, 1987, the residents of the "ad-
ministered territories began their uprising-the intifadah-
demanding, through various tactics (from rock throwing to
tax-strikes), their right to self-determination. Two years later,
the intifadah has developed into an organized system of
uprising. The intifadah has developed a few universal
precepts.
Most of Husans [a town in the West Bank]
3000 residents stay home from work several
days a month, observing the strike days
declared in bimonthly leaflets emanating from
the uprising's underground leaders. Some boy-
cott Israeli-made products... And twice a day
the young men stone the bus, the local intifadah
target. Those are Husan's village rules.22
II. The Israeli Courts
A. The Preservation of Democracy vs. the
Preservation of Israel
Israel's form of democracy has various descriptions:
"democracy under siege,'23 a "fighting democracy"2 4 and a
"defensive democracy. 25 In addition to its hostile and per-
sistently threatening neighbors, Israel is plagued by a se-
cond problem: it has no written constitution. Therefore,
when defending itself from internal and external subversives,
the Israelis have no written jurisprudential foundation ex-
cept the Basic Law26 and judicial decisions to guide their
behavior.
As a result, the Israeli Supreme Court "has become the
bastion of liberty and the rule of law in Israel today. 2' The
Israeli Supreme Court has clearly stated its constitutional
jurisprudence: national security and the survival of Israel
as a Jewish state have priority over civil rights. Exemplary
is the line of cases that began with Yerdor v. Chairman,
Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset28 and
continues with Neiman et al. v. Chairman of the Central
Committee for the Elections to the 11th Knesset.29 Both
of these cases involve the Central Election Committees
(CEC's) responsibility to "confirm" any list of candidates for
the Knesset.3 0
In Yeredor, a list of candidates from the "El Ard" party
were determined ineligible based on their status as an out-
lawed organization, with the destruction of Israel as a Jew-
ish state in their charter. In his judgement, the President
of the Supreme Court, Agranat, J., stated that the continu-
ing existence of the State of Israel was the major premise
in the light of which all Israeli laws need to be judged. Based
on the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Is-
rael, Judge Agranat determined that preserving the state
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was a "fundamental constitutional fact."3M
In Neiman, the court was afforded the opportunity to
use the CEC to directly address the tension between the
preservation of Israel and the preservation of democracy.32
In Neiman, the Central Election Committee had turned
down two lists, both decisions on appeal. One list was com-
prised of candidates from Progressive List for Peace (PLP),
an organization of Jews and Arabs whose views were close
to those of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The other
list was from "Kach," an organization headed by Meir
Kahane, a militant zionist.
Despite Kach's racist and undemocratic platform, the
court reversed the Committee's decision on the Kach list
and prescribed the certification of the list. The court based
their decision on a traditional interpretation of Yeredor, "ac-
cording to which only a list contesting the nature of the
State may be excluded by the Central Election Commit-
tee. A list, however, which endangers only the democratic
nature of the State, or is racist in character, is not liable
to be disqualified by the committee 33 In regards to the PLP
list, the court reaffirmed CEC's power to disqualify such
a list 34 based on the organization's stated goals that
challenged the preservation of Israel as a Jewish state.35
Justice Barak, in a concurrence, stated what seems to
be the more logical reasoning. [W]hile the Jewish charac-
ter of the State is founded in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the latter also refers to the principles of liberty, justice
and peace.., and assures full equality of social and political
rights to all citizens, without distinction of religion, race or
sex" In conclusion, Barak, J., writes '[d]emocracy must not
commit suicide in order to prove its existence. 36
B. Israeli Courts and International Law
Israel's official policy toward the occupied territories is
that of an "administrator." The Israeli position can be stat-
ed in sum: Israel considers itself the present power ad-
ministering the territories until a settlement is negotiated.
The Israeli courts had an opportunity to address hu-
man rights in the territories when they ruled on the appli-
cation of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War3' to the ter-
ritories.38 As a result of the decision not to apply the Fourth
Geneva Convention, Israel has carefully created, judicially
and legislatively, a territory that is not occupied, not an-
nexed and not independent.3 9
The conclusion of the courts is that international con-
ventions are "contractual' and therefore not binding on an
occupier unless they are incorporated into Israeli "municipal"
law through the legislature, the Knesset.4° Since the Israeli
Legislature does not consider itself an occupier, it has chos-
en not to incorporate the Fourth Geneva Convention for
the territories. International customary law, on the other
hand, is embodied in all law.4' Therefore, Israel considers
itself obligated to international customary law, but not any
formal conventions.
A poignant contention regarding the application of the
Fourth Geneva Convention is the Israeli practice of "settling"
the West Bank and Gaza Strip by Israeli nationals. 42 In
1979, the Rabbinical Court of Israel concluded:
... that we must deal with the claims to the
degree that they are based on... international
customary law, and that there is no basis [for the
Israeli Supreme Court] to relate claims based
on Article 49 of the Geneva Convention. Thus,
the discussion is narrowed down to the ques-
tion of whether the respondents violated inter-
national law .... 43
The Israeli court's attitude toward the territories is best
exemplified by a decision of the Arab Appeal Court of
1970. The Court of Appeal sitting in Ramallah stated that
"the occupying power is the proper authority to decide
whether or not there exists a necessity to make any amend-
ment or addition to the laws in force in the occupied
region."4 4 The Arab Appeal Court was part of a court sys-
tem that existed when Israel began the occupation of the
West Bank. Under Israeli occupation, at the time of this
case, judges were appointed by the Israeli military govern-
ment.
45
III. Israeli Justice in the Territories
Israel-proper has a civil court system. The territories
are under a military court system.46 The military courts on
the West Bank operate on the basis of the Order Regard-
ing Security Instructions adopted in 1967, and a new ord-
er issued in 1970 which superseded the previous one.47
Under military judicial law, the Palestinians are afford-
ed little, if any, due process.
Although the Israeli military court system
appears to have many of the features of a fair
system of justice, in reality the justice it dis-
penses is seriously flawed.
Most of the defense lawyers who were in-
terviewed [for the report], attached special sig-
nificance to two of the system's defects... Firstly,
they emphasized the critical importance and in-
justice of the prolonged period of interrogation
to which a detainee may be subjected without
access to independent legal or medical as-
sistance; most detainees give a signed confes-
sion during interrogation which it is extremely
difficult to retract despite evidence that it was
extracted under duress. Secondly, the lawyers
stressed the apparent sustained partiality of
many military court judges. 48
The orders maintaining the courts49 allow the courts
to deviate from the rules of evidence and leave to the dis-
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cretion of the Regional Military Commander whether the
defendant will be allowed to appeal outside of the courts.
50
The settlers, in contrast, are governed by Israeli law. They
are subject to the Israeli civil court system (and the due
process it guarantees) as if they were in Israel-proper.
Two laws, passed by the Israeli Knesset, widen this
justice gap even further. The Extension of Validity Law gives
the Minister of Justice the power to introduce the entire
body of Israeli statutes to the territories and apply them
only to the Israeli nationals residing there.5" The Develop-
ment Towns and Regions Law ensures this preferential
treatment.
52
This dual system of justice is best illustrated by the
sentencing practices of the two courts. In a recent case,
an Israeli motorist, who was being attacked by stone-
throwers in Gaza, shot to death a Palestinian schoolgirl.
The Israeli court convicted him of causing death by negli-
gence he received a seven-month suspended sentence. The
stone-thrower, if caught and prosecuted under the military
judicial system, could receive up to two years in jail even
without causing any injury.5 3
The system of military justice has not
coped well with the challenges posed by the in-
tifadah.... The judicial system is supposed to
be the authority's principal tool for enforcing
military law in the territories. It is apparent that
this system is not functioning in a manner
which inspires confidence. . .
IV. The Right to Act
[T]he existence of a right of resistance of
the vistims of governmental opprhession ...
has be[come] recognized with regard to . . .
denial of self-determination. 5
The Right to Act is a concept based on being put in
the situation of choosing between submission to unjust
laws, or violent resistance to the unjust laws.5 6 "If oppres-
sive political violence is used in a setting that precludes
reasonable recourse to nonviolent methods of resistance
and struggle, the reactive violence of proportionate and dis-
criminatory character is a legitimate exercise of popular
rights (inherent in popular sovereignty) of self-defense."7
Martin Luther King, Jr., a leading proponent of civil dis-
obedience as an effective tool for change, stated that "one
has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws " 8 Mal-
com X, assassinated leader of the Nation of Islam, brought
this one step further. "Revolutions are never based upon
that which is begging a corrupt society or a corrupt sys-
tem to accept us into it." 9 Civil disobedience, then, becomes
a method of revolution. Indeed, "it is far more difficult than
it used to be to draw a hard and fast line of distinction be-
tween revolutionary action and civil disobedient action."60
In December of 1987, the Palestinian's acted upon their
Right to Act, and began the intifadah, a revolutionary move-
ment based on civil disobedient action, devoted to the
shaking-off of Israeli occupation.
Israel's reaction to the violent components of the in-
tifadah is a form of reactive terrorism. Terrorism has been
defined as "any political violence that lacks an adequate
moral and legal justification, regardless of whether the ac-
tor is a revolutionary group or a government "6 Under this
definition, governmental functionaries following state poli-
cy are terrorists.62
Israel's use of terrorist tactics can be demonstrated by
the Israeli army's use of industrial stone throwers, 'ugly half-
track vehicle[s] that grind stones into pebbles then spray
[them] at demonstrators.63 Sc in fact, to fight the 'terrorists,
Israel has incorporated the terrorist tactics. With Israel,
though, the stone throwers are "industrial" machines, not
teenagers."
The Right to Act also involves an element of limiting
responses to responsible levels. The intifadah's conscious
decision to embrace this element of proportional response
is based primarily on survival. Most village intifadah activists
have a "no guns" rule. "We threw one Molotov cocktail and
they threatened to destroy our houses. It was decided, no
guerilla warfare."65 As long as the intifadah participants con-
tain their actions and reactions to rock-throwing, the Israeli
terrorist response will stay at that level. The proponents
of the intifadah understand this. If the intifadah increases
the violence to use of "guns, the Israeli reaction will definitely
involve destructive activity, specifically, the demolition of
Palestinian homes.6
6
The intifadah's "no guns" rule can be attributed to two
things, a Palestinian attachment to their ancestral home
and the tremendous suffering that an escalation would en-
tail. By the current rules, neither of these are at risk when
throwing stones.
[T]he core meaning of civil disobedience in
the intifadah is not as a tactic to do anything.
Rather, as a mass action, civil disobedience is
the withdrawal of the generalized obedience
constitutive of Israeli rule.
67
V. The Intifadah and De Facto Statehood
The intifadah represents the general understanding of
the Palestinian people that their allegiance and obedience
is to their own people, their own law, not to the Israeli
govemment.68 The intifadah is the struggle for the transfer
of authority. Once that authority is successfully transferred,
regardless of anything Israel says or does, Palestine has be-
come a state. The intifadah facilitates that transfer of power.
Since its beginning on December 9, 1987, the Pales-
tinian intifadah has witnessed a dramatic shift from spon-
taneous protests to organized uprising. A definite structure
for intifadah resistance has developed.
The youngest category of childreh involved
in demonstrations is the seven-to-ten age group.
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Most of the time these children may be seen
rolling tires to the middle of the road, pouring
gasoline on them, and then setting them afire.
... The eleven-to-fourteen age group is assigned
the task of placing large stones in the road to
slow down or stop traffic.... The fifteen-to-
nineteen group comprises the veteran stone
throwers.... Palestinians over age nineteen
take key positions in order to lead the entire
team .... 69
The young [people] of the village do say
they feel a need to consult the leadership-each
faction in every village has a contact person in
the nearest large town .... 70
One of the official structures that manages the in-
tifadah is the Unified National Command of the Uprising.71
This underground political structure is responsible for dis-
tributing dated and serially numbered leaflets that announce
strike days, economic boycotts, and stone-throwing tar-
gets.7 2
On January 28, 1988, the Unified National Command
regularized the scattered commercial work stoppages.73
Since that time, on announced strike days, "[s]hopkeepers
[open] only three hours per day, at a time designated by
the Command, so that residents could obtain necessities.
The [Israeli military try] to force shops to open by smash-
ing locks and rolling up shutters, but shopkeepers typical-
ly refuse to come to the shops and residents refrain from
looting open but untended shops"14 Besides partial strikes,
the Command calls for complete strikes on significant oc-
casions, such as the second month anniversary of the up-
rising or the assassination or arrest of uprising leaders.75
March 1988 was the month that the command called
for the resignation of Palestinians from all Israeli adminis-
trative and governance bodies in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. 'This call resulted in the virtual emptying of the Arab
police forces and tax collection officers in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip and the dismantling of the Israeli-appointed
municipal administrations 7 6
Dr. Hana Mikhail Ashrawi, Dean of the Faculty of Arts
at Bir Zeit University on the West Bank describes the in-
tifadah as a "genuine grassroots movement" that "cuts
across all lines of distinction such as region, sex, religion,
and political/factional affiliation"77 Dr. Ashrawi goes on to
explain that the intifadah has created a "two-way system
of communication whereby the Unified National Leader-
ship's role is not solely to lead but to articulate the demands
and different modes of struggle which are sought and are
capable of being sustained by the masses"78
The grassroots efforts of the intifadah are accomplish-
ing two concrete goals: an intelligent "shaking off of Israeli
occupation, 9 and, the structure and facilitation of a self-
sufficient nation, a de facto nation and people.
A. The Shaking-Off
It is no longer economically, socially or politically in-
telligent for Israel to 'administer" the territories.
In financial terms the costliest price is the loss of ex-
ports to the West Bank. Before the intifadah, Palestinians
bought over one billion dollars in Israeli goods; that figure
is down thirty-percent. 80 As one Palestinian says, "the only
Israeli product we buy now is spray paint. 81 In addition,
Israel has forfeited $800 million in lost production, lost
tourism and military costs.82
Socially, Israel is plagued by divisions within its own
political structure. The use of a heavy-hand in the territo-
ries has had an effect on morale in the Israeli Army. Inter-
nationally, Israel's image is suffering.83 And, Israel is finding
that many American Jews are not so easily persuaded that
Israeli policy in the territories is appropriate.
Finally, and most on-point, is the cost to democracy.
Israel's democracy is already on fragile footing, character-
ized by the Neiman case.84 The Israeli reaction to the in-
tifadah is eroding the democratic principles it does have.
It is one thing to put down short-term rioting, it is another
to continue to suppress a sustained effort for self-
determination. 'The longer Palestinians remain subject to
'administrative detention' and are deprived of self-
government, the more Israeli's corrode their own devotion
to democracy.8
B. Palestinian Self-Sufficiency
The intifadah has brought a great many hardships to
the Palestinians. These hardships are both self-imposed -
in the form of strike-days and boycotts- and also a result
of Israeli reactions to intifadah acts. These hardships have
been incorporated into the intifadah and considered a cost
worth paying for self-determination.8 6 In the process, they
have helped create a de facto state.87
Focusing on community survival on the
land, new means of self-reliance have begun to
emerge: popular committees, "victory gardens,"
and social and economic mediating structures.
Locally run schools, health clinics and local
police forces have also appeared. This drive for
self sufficiency is the beginning of organized ef-
forts to provide local answers to shortages
created by ... the intifadah ... 88
To be sure, this entails a drastic reduction in the
standard of living, but local self-sufficiency has
proved to be viable even under extreme assaults
by the occupation forces, including 40-day cur-
fews and the cutting off of food, water and other
services.
8 9
The Palestinians have shown an ability to be self-
sufficient. In their effort to withdraw allegiance and obed-
ience from the Israeli administrative apparatus, the
81
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I
Palestinians have developed their own system to align with.
"As the Palestinian population withdrew from the appara-
tus of occupation, it attempted to strengthen institutions
of self-governance and to establish new ones. Local com-
mittees, called popular committees, organized daily life and
built a measure of self-sufficiency.9
There are many communities in the territories that are
rarely visited by Israeli troops and are, in effect, indepen-
dent Palestinian towns.9' Kafr Malik, a town southeast of
Ramallah, is such a community. To the outside observer
it looks like the capital of the Palestinian state, complete
with a center square and flagpole that flies the outlawed
Palestinian flag. Kafr Malik's "independence' can be attribut-
ed to its own stone quarry, which employs seventy-percent
of the residents. In addition, because of the structure of the
buildings within Kafr Malik, settlers and soldiers rarely use
it as a shortcut. The buildings provide ideal protection for
stone throwers. "After repeated stonings, Israelis started tak-
ing the long way around"92 This is an example of success-
ful shaking off.
In addition, there are other factors that contribute to
Palestinds statehood. The territories have not been annexed
by any other state. The population in the territories (be-
side Israeli nationalist settlers) is almost entirely Palestini-
an. Israel no longer has broad, generalized obedience within
the territories. 93 The Palestiniads have developed a "quasi-
government" that rules and makes decisions. 94 And, final-
ly, the State of Palestine has declared its independence.
Because of the intifadah and its revolution-
ary irreversible impulse, the history of Palestine
has therefore arrived at a decisive juncture
... The Palestine National Council... hereby
proclaims the establishment of the State of
Palestine on our Palestinian territory....
VI. Conclusion
Discussion of human rights in Palestine
differs markedly from discussion of human
rights in most other locations. With respect to
Palestine, and its people, human rights depri-
vations are part of a broader deprivation of ex-
istence as a nation. Individual deprivation
cannot be viewed accurately, therefore, unless
it is considered in the context of the larger depri-
vation of national existence.
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equal representation for all people who care to consider
themselves "Israeli." Regardless of the Jewish majority that
would remain, a guarantee of a Jewish homeland, as there
is now, would not remain.
This is not a true alternative. It is recognized by the
international community that there should be a Jewish
state. And, indeed, there should be such a state.97
The other option is for Israel to directly address the
demands of the intifadah. The success of the intifidah man-
dates this.
The intifadah has successfully publicized the Palestin-
ian demand-for democracy. Palestinians are demanding full
citizenship. This fundamental precept of democracy (full
citizenship) cannot be ignored.
In the process of the intifadah, Palestine has solidified
as a people. Yet, the Palestinian peoples demands for full
citizenship have been met with Israel's democratic contradic-
tion. In order to choose the course that will enhance Is-
rael's democracy, Israel must concede98 to the Palestinian
people a place where they can be full citizens. 99
Meanwhile, the Palestinian people continue to remain
an "occupied" people. New generations of Palestinians are
being born and raised knowing nothing but barbed wired,
military restrictions and Israeli military occupation. The
Palestinian children of the West Bank and Gaza Strip play
childrens games that evidence their highly politicized and
threatened lives. The game of "soldier and martyr" involves
one child pretending to be an Israeli soldier beating on the
other children, who are playing the 'martyrs"' 0 Especially
for these children and their generation, a Palestinian state
must be created. Life under military occupation must be
ended.
As all of the parties involved work toward developing
a mutual trust, so must Israel work toward the creation,
facilitation and especially the recognition of sovereignty and
self-determination for the Palestinian people. In so doing,
Israel will safeguard its precarious democracy by removing
the undemocratic blemish of its occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, Israel will also secure
and reaffirm its mission to the international Jewish com-
munity.
It is in Israel's best interest to begin this process. The
intifadah's "no guns" attitude cannot continue indefinitely.
Eventually, frustration with the status-quo will lead to more
violent resistance. This may lead to stronger Israeli reac-
tion. To that end, we will find all-out war. This solution to
the problem must be proscribed.
A determining factor in this discussion is the inherent
contradiction of Zionist democracy. For Israel to maintain
itself as a Jewish state it must limit democratic representa-
tion in some ways. In so doing, it undermines its democratic
credentials.
One way for Israel to shed this contradiction, and there-
by enhance its democracy, is to stop being what makes it
Israel. It would have to become a secular state with full and
SPRING 1990
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